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Abstract
In this work we present and formally analyze CHAT-SRP (CHAos
based Tickets-Secure Registration Protocol), a protocol to provide inter-
active and collaborative platforms with a cryptographically robust solu-
tion to classical security issues. Namely, we focus on the secrecy and au-
thenticity properties while keeping a high usability. In this sense, users are
forced to blindly trust the system administrators and developers. More-
over, as far as we know, the use of formal methodologies for the verifica-
tion of security properties of communication protocols isn’t yet a common
practice. We propose here a methodology to fill this gap, i.e., to analyse
both the security of the proposed protocol and the pertinence of the un-
derlying premises. In this concern, we propose the definition and formal
evaluation of a protocol for the distribution of digital identities. Once
distributed, these identities can be used to verify integrity and source of
information. We base our security analysis on tools for automatic verifica-
tion of security protocols widely accepted by the scientific community, and
on the principles they are based upon. In addition, it is assumed perfect
cryptographic primitives in order to focus the analysis on the exchange of
protocol messages. The main property of our protocol is the incorpora-
tion of tickets, created using digests of chaos based nonces (numbers used
only once) and users’ personal data. Combined with a multichannel au-
thentication scheme with some previous knowledge, these tickets provide
security during the whole protocol by univocally linking each registering
user with a single request. This way, we prevent impersonation and Man
In The Middle attacks, which are the main security problems in registra-
tion protocols for interactive platforms. As a proof of concept, we also
present the results obtained after testing this protocol with real users, at
our university, in order to measure the usability of the registration system.
1 Introduction
Modularity is one of the most relevant aspect of modern engineering practices.
Regarding cryptographic applications, this property resorts to distinguishing the
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formal aspect of cryptographic protocols from the inner details of the underly-
ing algorithms (see [2, 24]). In this vein, we can design strong cryptographic
algorithms for confidentiality, integrity and authentication, but applying them
incorrectly would lead to security flaws. Therefore, the study of the security
of a cryptographic protocol demands to examine the security of cryptographic
primitives from a computational point of view, but also to evaluate the goodness
of the integration of those primitives. In this work we propose a registration
protocol for interactive platforms.
The proper design and evaluation of cryptograpic protocols is critical when
personal information is exchanged. This is the case of interactive and collab-
orative platforms, which are of great importance in the current state of com-
munications, specially after the irruption of web 2.0 technologies. This type of
applications are used to share and exchange information, even critical personal
data [35]. Nonetheless, users’ trust is generally implicitly assumed and there is
no explicit application of procedures to secure users’ registration and exchange
of information. In the context of interactive applications, and always from a
general point of view, the main properties of the underlying security system
rely completely on the correct implementation and subsequent management of
the system. Privacy, secrecy and authenticity are assumed when users get into
the system, i.e., by adhering straightway to solutions provided by administrators
and developers. In this sense, the only way to incorporate the basics of infor-
mation security is through properly using standard tools proposed, evaluated
and validated by the cryptography and information security community.
On the regard of applying standard and validated tecnologies, we have previ-
ously introduced a registration protocol to enhance interactive platforms’ secu-
rity [17]. This registration protocol links each user to a digital identity, giving
users access to the cryptographic tools sustaining confidentiality and authen-
ticity, i.e., (client-side) encryption and digital signatures. The service provided
by our registration protocol could seem similar to the protection given by SSL-
tunneled communications. Nevertheless, it rather complements SSL instead of
overlapping its functionality: SSL provides secrecy and server side authentica-
tion, whilst client-side authentication cannot be provided by SSL as long as the
client does not have a digital identity, which he would have once incorporated
our protocol into the system. Moreover, thanks to the distribution of digital
identities, and the cryptographic functionality they make available, their infor-
mation may be also protected in the servers, since it can be encrypted or signed
at client side. Therefore the sensitive information will be protected not only
during the communications. And even more, this way, users will have a greater
(and justified) sensation of security, which contributes to preserve a very impor-
tant property (when it is correctly grounded) of information security systems:
users’ confidence in the system.
In this work we further refine the previous protocol, and formally analyse
its security properties. Our protocol is based on Email Based Identification
and Authentication (EBIA), which links each new user to an email account.
This kind of registration protocols for interactive platforms is widely extended
in the internet. Nevertheless, there are two main security problems with these
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protocols: impersonation and Man In The Middle (MITM) attacks. We tackle
these problems here, proposing methods for circumventing them.
In any case, for guaranteeing that the ultimately distributed digital identities
will successfully provide all their functionality, we need to ensure that we leave
no unnoticed “security holes” in the registration protocol. To the best of our
knowledge, and from a general point of view, implementation and design of
registration protocols are not evaluated according to a formal methodology and
using specialized tools intended for that end, like [6, 12]. In our work, we address
this problem incorporating a phase-divided methodology, and using formal tools
(in our case, ProVerif [12]) for the verification of the required security properties.
It is worth to emphasize that we restrain ourselves to analyzing the security of
the protocol itself, i.e., of the exchange of messages, while assuming a perfect
cryptography model for all the cryptographic primitives used. Additionally, the
final step of our work is on testing the usability of the protocol, in practice. In
order to test it in a real scenario, we have incorporated the protocol in a Moodle
platform. Moodle is probably the most extended e-learning platform worldwide
nowadays [21]. It is also a perfect example of interactive and collaborative
platform managing lots of sensitive data. But even more, EBIA is one of the
most used authentication modules when working with Moodle. Therefore, it is
a suitable context to test our protocol in.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we make an outline
of the basic registration protocols for interactive platforms and expose their main
security problems. In Section 3 we explain the methodology followed during our
work. Afterwards, in Section 4 we introduce our new protocol, covering the first
four steps of the procedure proposed in Section 3 and justifying the decissions
that have led us to its final form. Section 5 is dedicated to the last step of our
methodology, centered on the formal verification of the protocol. In Section 5 we
also treat the usability properties of CHAT-SRP, showing the results obtained
during tests performed with real users. At last, we conclude in Section 6, with
an overview of our work and some discussions on future work.
2 A brief security analysis of interactive registra-
tion protocols
Our registration protocol takes as starting point the EBIA approach, reinforcing
it with robust cryptographic functionality to guarantee secrecy and authenticity.
EBIA is the most widely used registration and authentication system in interac-
tive and collaborative systems (see [22]). The reason of taking it as starting point
is its high expansion and usability, as every user of the internet is accustomed to
its principles. Basically, for a given email address, e.g. alice@email.dom, EBIA
says that if somebody can read an email sent to alice@email.dom, then she/he
is the legitimate owner of that email account. As a result, EBIA assigns her/his
virtual identity to that email address. During the registration process, the user
has to access an activation link sent in an email in order to activate the account
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(this process is schematized in Fig. 1).
Figure 1: Behaviour of EBIA systems
(1) The user sends the request with his data. (2) The server validates the data
and sends an activation link via email. (3) The user accesses the activation link.
Such a registration process presents two main security flaws. First, the activa-
tion email is sent unencrypted, which makes possible to mount a MITM attack
(see [5, Chapter 2]). Let us consider the illustrative example shown in Fig. 2.
If the attacker Eve wants to impersonate Alice in a web site using EBIA, she
can proceed as follows: first, Eve waits until Alice sends a registration request
to the Web Server (WS); then, the WS will send an activation email to Alice’s
email account; after gaining control of an intermediary server, Eve intercepts
the unencrypted email, gets the activation link, and blocks the email impeding
to reach Alice’s email account; at last, Eve just needs to access the link in order
to successfully complete the impersonation attack. As Alice did not receive an
email, she will probably just think that an error occurred. As we discuss later,
we use registration tickets for ensuring that whoever starts a registration request
is the one obtaining the corresponding digital identity.
Now, let us assume that the previous problem is indeed solved. Then, the
second problem is that if the attacker knows all the required data for a user to
be registered, he can successfully impersonate him from the beginning. To the
best of our knowledge, the easiest (and maybe only) solution to this problem
is to link identities distribution with some previous information known by the
registrar about the users. In this respect, and before the registration request, the
registrar must possess some information concerning the user. This imposes very
strong limitations to the contexts in which the resulting registration protocol
will be suitable for. Nevertheless, there are many situations in which this is not
an unreasonable requirement. In our case, we will require the registrar to know
the mobile phone number of the users. With it, we will be able to perform a
multichannel protocol with an authenticated channel (the mobile phone), which
guarantees that the user completing registration is who claims to be.
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Figure 2: Attack to EBIA system. (1) Alice requests registration to the Web
Server; (2) The server sends the activation email to Alice, containing the acti-
vation link, which passes through an infected intermediary server under Eve’s
control. (3) Eve intercepts and blocks the activation email, and activates the
account in Alice’s behalf. Alice will probably just think that an error occurred.
3 Methodology for design and verification of se-
cure protocols
When considering implementation and design of registration protocols, the most
common practice is adhering to a security model, design the protocol, and in-
formally claim that the protocol is secure according to the assumed security
model. In other words, security is assumed instead of being formally tested.
The lack of a formal methodology to evaluate security leads to unnoticed er-
rors, which may later cause severe damage to the protocols or even make them
useless. Consequently, it is highly convenient to adopt methodologies based on
the formal analysis of protocols, as the one applied in [36] for verification of an
electronic voting system. In this vein, we propose the procedure schematized
in Fig. 3, which consists of five stages. The first stage define the goals of our
protocol, enabling the identification of critical aspects and the complexity of the
associated problem. After this initial analysis, we have enough information to
concrete an abstract model in coherence with the practical scenario where the
protocol will run (second stage of the methodology). According to the security
abstract model, in the third stage we formally define the security properties
and discuss their feasibility. Sometimes, this “preliminary” analysis is omitted
because we think that we perfectly know our context, and it is not worth the
effort. However, as it is said in [26], it is desirable and beneficial to follow a
methodological approach for establishing the desired security goals and require-
ments. Finally, the protocol is designed and formalized in order to be analyzed
with automatic and proved tools (stages four and five).
It can be seen that the steps of our methodology follow a natural order. As
far as we know, steps one and, sometimes, three are usually ignored, which can
involve contradictions and/or disregarding of the relevance of some property.
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Figure 3: Proposed procedure for the creation and design of secure protocols: (1)
Make clear the protocol goals; (2) Establish the security model and assumptions;
(3) Determine the required security properties for achieving the goals; (4) Design
and formalize the protocol; (5) Carry out a formal verification of the required
security properties.
The second step, although it may be commonly applied in any explicit way,
helps modelling the scenario and determining the security properties. These
three first steps can be summarized in a more general phase: the protocol (and
environment) characterization. Nevertheless it is worth separating them, since
although related, they are intended for different aims. The fourth step could
be introduced within the fifth one (since formal verification of the protocol
demands its previous formalization), but it is worth to be considered separately,
since improves the designer’s knowledge of the protocol. Note that we have
included a loop back from the fifth to the fourth step, in case some security
property is not held (we assume that if a security property is not possible in a
given environment, it will be detected in the first three steps).
As we will see in the subsequent sections, we have followed this methodology
for the design and evaluation of our protocol.
4 The proposed protocol: CHAT-SRP
In this section we present CHAT-SRP, our proposed registration protocol. We
introduce here the first four steps of the proposed methodology, reasoning about
why the main modifications over EBIA are necessary. We leave the formal se-
curity analysis for the following sections, where we will show that the imperson-
ation and MITM attacks explained before are avoided.
4.1 Protocol characterization: goals, security model and
security requirements
CHAT-SRP is a registration protocol mainly intended for interactive and col-
laborative platforms. Therefore, its goal is to provide new users with digital
identities. These digital identities are intented to be used for cryptographic
purposes, like encryption and digital signatures. Obviously, the user will take
active part in the protocol. Also, several servers will interact between them
during registration.
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Regarding the assumed security model, we have based our analysis upon the
Dolev-Yao model [18]. In it, the cryptographic primitives used are supposed
to be perfectly secure, i.e., the attacker is not able to decipher the encrypted
messages unless he has the corresponding decryption key, the random number
generators create unpredictable random numbers, etc. Nevertheless, the at-
tacker is assumed to be active, which means that he can intercept, resend, and
insert messages. We take into account both external and internal attackers (see
[15] for definitions concerning the location of the attacker). In order to model
internal attackers, we allow the establishment of SSL sessions with the trusted
third parties of the system. This way, an attacker has the capability to act from
the inside.
A registration protocol is really an authentication protocol executed for a
first time. As it is stated in [38], authentication protocols require two main
properties: authentication and key distribution. The authentication property
refers to being certain of the identity of the users, i.e., of the authenticity of
all the data they provide, including their identities. The key distribution also
deals with secrecy, assuring that the new users will be able to communicate
with the rest of the principals preserving the confidenciality of the information
transmitted through the network. Therefore, we will incorportate authenticity
and secrecy into CHAT-SRP as a commitment.
4.2 Description of the protocol
Now we have covered the first three steps of the procedure (see Fig. 3). But
before undertaking the fourth one, we explain in more depth the protocol in-
ternals. Once we have gained an in-depth knowledge of it, we will proceed with
the formalization.
The principals involved in the protocol are four:
• The User, which is the one starting the protocol by asking for a new digital
identity linked to her/his email.
• The Web Server (WS), which is the entity attending registration requests
and acting as intermediary between the User and the Registration Au-
thority. In addition, it generates the activation email, and performs some
easy checks. This is a trusted server!
• The Registration Authority (RA), which is on charge of creating the tick-
ets, i.e., of linking each user with a single ticket. This is a trusted server!
• The Certification Authority (CA), that creates the final digital identities
upon requests of the RA. This is a trusted server!
The messages sequence between the principals is depicted in Fig. 4, where
the continuous lines represent SSL protected communications (with server au-
thentication), and the dashed ones represent unprotected communications. The
unprotected communications are the messages 6.2 (email sent via SMTP) and
the user accesses to the activation link through message 7.1. This last message
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is modelled as unprotected because the communications are assumed not to be
anonymized, and thus the attacker will be able to link the accessed URL and the
user by listening on the communication channel. It is worth mentioning that in
the diagram shown in Fig. 4 the activation email and the ticket are sent to the
user as separate messages (messages 6.1 and 6.2 in the diagram). In addition,
the user accesses the activation link and sends the ticket separately (messages
7.1 and 7.2 in the diagram). Nevertheless, in the formalization, both messages
6.1 and 6.2, and messages 7.1 and 7.2, are merged into messages 6 and 7, with
unencrypted and encrypted parts.
Concerning the principals distribution accross the network architecture, ob-
viously the user is an independent component by itself; but the network archi-
tecture of the three servers, i.e., WS, RA and CA is configurable. This means
that they can be all in the same physical server, each one at a different server,
or WS and RA in one machine and the CA in another. This is up to the system
administrator. It is usually advised to keep the CA at a safe place, even without
direct connection to the internet, using a “proxy” between it and the requesting
users1. Typically, this proxy is the RA, which does have access to the internet
to receive registration requests. A sample network architecture with each server
at a different machine is depicted in Figs. 5 and 6, including the messages sent
between them during the protocol. Both images correspond to the two main
parts of the protocol. In the first part, the user makes the registration request,
obtaining a ticket linked to his email and personal data along with an activation
link; in the second part, the user utilizes that ticket in order to obtain his final
digital identity.
4.3 Robust multichannel authentication
In order to get registered into a typical interactive system, a user has to pro-
vide some personal data, which will be used during the digital identity creation.
This data typically consists at least on a name and surname, email, and prob-
ably some other optional data (like postal address, phone numbers, or some
national/organizational identification number). It is known that all this data is
not too hard to obtain by combining internet searches with techniques such as
social engineering ([5, Chapter 2]), or phishing [32]. If the attacker knows all
the personal data of the person he wants to impersonate (and that person is
not already in the system), then the attacker just needs to start the registration
process and supply all the needed data.
The problem exposed in the preceeding paragraph is exactly that of discerning
between authentication of origin and entity authentication, as described in [34,
p. 8]. The first refers to the fact of being sure where a message come from (for
example, the machine alice.ii.uam.es), while the second refers to who sent it
(for example Alice). As settled in [34], this difference is often unclear, maybe
because the consequences of one usually overlap with the consequences of the
other. To be even clearer, let us make use of a pedagogical example: Alice can
1See, for instance, the example given at http://www.ejbca.org/architecture.html
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User WS RA CA
(1) username, user@email.dom
(2) username,code
(3) username,code
(4) getTicket(user@email.dom)
(5) hash(nonce·user@email.dom)
(6.1) hash(nonce·user@email.dom)
(6.2) www.activation.lnk
(7.1) www.activation.lnk
(7.2) hash(nonce·user@email.dom)
(8) hash(nonce·user@email.dom)
(9) getID(user@email.dom)
(10) ID(user@email.dom)
(11) ID(user@email.dom)
(12) ID(user@email.dom)
Figure 4: Sequence diagram of the messages exchanged during the protocol.
The dashed lines represent unprotected communications; the thin continuous
ones represent SSL protected communications, and the thick continuous line
represents the message sent using the extra authenticated channel (SMS): (1)
The user requests registration, providing his personal identification data; (2)
The WS sends a code to the mobile phone number associated to the requesting
user; (3) The user provides the recevied code to the WS; (4) The WS forwards
the request to the RA; (5) The RA generates a ticket for the user, and sends
it to the WS; (6.1) The WS forwards the ticket to the user via SSL; (6.2) The
WS generates an activation link and sends it via SMTP to the user; (7.1) The
user accesses the activation link; (7.2) The users sends the ticket to the WS; (8)
After verifying the activation link, the WS forwards the ticket to the RA; (9)
After verifying the ticket and deleting it, the RA requests the CA to issue a new
digital identity; (10) The CA generates the user’s digital identity and sends it
to the RA; (11) The RA forwards the digital identity to the WS; (12) Finally,
the WS forwards the digital identity to the user. Although it is not explicitly
depicted, we assume that several different SSL sessions are established between
the User and the WS during the registration process. Nevertheless, this will be
modelled in the subsequent formalizations.
send a message from her host alice.ii.uam.es, which is legitimate. But if her host
gets infected by Eve, then the communicating entity will be Eve, although the
origin of the communication will still be alice.ii.uam.es. This is a clear violation
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Figure 5: First half of the protocol: The user requests registration. After
validating the user data, the WS sends an SMS with a code to the mobile phone
number associated the new user. If the user correctly returns the code, the WS
forwards the request to the RA, who generates a valid ticket linked to the user.
When received the ticket, the WS also generates an activation link for that user,
sending the ticket through SSL and the link via email. Here, kuw represents the
SSL key between the user and the WS, and kwr represents the SSL key between
the WS and the RA.
of the entity authentication property (see Fig. 7).
In [37] the authors propose the use of multiple channels, each with different
security properties, in order to achieve authenticated communications. For ex-
ample, they make use of an extra channel with low transmission capacity but
which cannot be tampered with, although it may be subject to eavesdropping.
This low capacity but secure channel is used to transmit a single bit of infor-
mation, telling if the verification of the previous steps, carried on over a high
capacity but unsecure channel, has been successful or not. If the outcome of
such verification is positive, given their protocol, the communication will be
origin authenticated. The authors in [19, 30] make a similar use of this mul-
tichannel combination in order to achieve entity authentication. Namely, they
make use of mobile phones, which are used to receive and/or send a One Time
Pin which will be returned in order to confirm they are the legitimate owners of
that phone number. This is basically the same concept we used with emails, but
with a subtle difference: users tend to control more tightly their mobile phones
than their emails.
This subtle fact is something worth considering in some depth. In [19] it is
reminded that there are basically three ways for verifying entity authentication:
KBA or Knowledge Based Authentication (something you know), TBA or To-
ken Based Authentication (something you have) and BBA or Biometrics Based
10
Figure 6: Second half of the protocol: The user generates a id request, accesses
the activation link, and provides the registration ticket. After validating the
user data, the WS forwards the ticket to the RA, who validates it using the
nonce and email associated to that user, stored previously (see step 3 of Fig.
5), and requests the CA the generation of a digital identity for that user. The
CA generates the ID and sends it to the user, passing through the RA and
the WS. Here, kuw represents the SSL key between the user and the WS, kwr
represents the SSL key between the WS and the RA, and krc represents the SSL
key between the RA and the CA.
Figure 7: Illustration of identity theft violating entity authentication: If Eve
gains control over Alice’s host, the entity authentication property is broken.
Authentication (something you are). Nevertheless, there is a key concept that
11
is usually not even mentioned: the robustness of the authentication procedures
is very dependant on the user perception about losing control of the supporting
token or device, since a possible lost could be expensive or annoying. This fact is
obvious for BBA (everyone tends to avoid losing his own fingers or eyes), but it
is no that obvious for KBA or TBA. Even more for KBA, because people using
TBA are usually more security-concerned users. And precisely, KBA is what
affects us, because the problem we have is that we assume someone’s identity
based on personal data required and, maybe, the fact of knowing the password
to access an email account.
So, as considered above, we need to provide our KBA system with something
that makes the users think twice if their actions can lead to an annoying or
undesirable situation, while keeping the usability of the system. The systems
proposed in [19, 30] achieve precisely this property, providing a notorial im-
provement in security while not (or almost not) reducing usability. The use of
mobile phones for this purpose suits our needs, as the fact of losing one’s mobile
phone leads to an annoying situation, since mobile phones are currently per-
ceived as a more critical personal property than an email (maybe because they
have physical presence). Therefore, the insertion of an additional step involving
the sending of a message containing a One Time Pin or something similar could
help us in our efforts to achieve entity authentication. Moreover, as observed in
[37], it will also help the user to avoid attacks to his account. If a user receives a
message at his mobile phone indicating that some action has been performed in
her/his behalf, and he is not responsible for it, then someone must be trying to
impersonate him, and he can just inform of the fact to thwart the attack. These
reasons have led us to incorporate the extra mobile phone channel in order to
overcome all the previously explained problems.
Nevertheless, there still exists a usability problem here. The perfect situation
will be that in which the Service Provider (in our case, the WS) knows in
advance the mobile number of the user. If not, then the attacker could simply
provide the valid email of the user he wants to impersonate, and then give his
own mobile number. This may be an unfeasible task for many of the web sites,
but, for example, in the case of a university that wants its students and teachers
to be registered in an e-learning platform, this is not such a hard measure. The
university will simply need to ask their students/teachers to provide their mobile
phone number when they get enrolled or hired. And from then on, the users
will be able to use their mobile phones to authenticate themselves, and even to
update their own mobile phone number.
4.4 Ticket generation
As it can be seen in the sequence diagram depicted in Fig. 4 and in Figs.
5 and 6, the ticket generation takes place at the RA after receiving its first
message of the protocol. After validating the user data, and checking that no
user with that email has already requested a ticket,2 the RA creates a new one
2Other checks, like unicity of username, are done in the WS, but the RA only has to process
the tickets.
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for the requesting user. In order to do that, a nonce is generated. The nonce
generation is of paramount importance to our protocol, as it is the element
that allows us to assert that a user successfully retrieving a digital identity
is the one who started the registration process. Therefore, we should adhere
to the commitments of eSTREAM project3 to get an appropiate method to
generate nonces. In our case, we have used a chaos based Pseudo-Random
Number Generator [33]. Certainly, chaotic systems can be employed as skeleton
of new, secure and efficient PRNGs (see [4]). Furthermore, cryptanalysis work
in the field of chaos-based cryptography shows that security and efficiency can
be achieved when there exists a proper combination of chaotic dynamics and
the standards of conventional cryptography [3, 8, 7, 20].
Once obtained the nonce, it is concatenated with the user email, and passed
through a one way hash function. This way, the user request has been univocally
linked to the freshly created ticket. This ticket is sent securely to the user
through messages 3 and 4, and it has to be returned later to the RA through
messages 5 and 6 for the user to prove himself against the authority as the
starter of the registration process. This very ticket is what prevents attacks
like the one described in the Introduction, as only the user who started the
communication is the one in posession of the correct ticket.
4.5 Comparison with EBIA
To be more clear about the reinforcements introduced by our protocol over
EBIA, we summarize them here, restating the attacks avoided with their incor-
poration.
First, with the incorporation of the authenticated mobile phone channel we
ensure that the users who succeed in the registration process are who they say
they are. Note that the mobile numbers are previously known by the registrar
(the WS in our case). In classic EBIA there is no way to avoid this, since there
is no previous knowledge about the users. Even if the registrar knew that a
specific email is indeed associated to a given user, since the email is inherently
an insecure channel, it does not guarantee the authenticity (nor the secrecy) of
the messages sent during the protocol.
Second, let us suppose that we want to use classic EBIA, but with the extra
mobile phone authenticated channel. If, after the user succesfully provides the
code sent to him by the mobile phone, we carry on using classic EBIA, then
the MITM attack depicted in Section 2 (Fig. 2) is still possible. Therefore, the
previous multichannel authentication by itself does not guarantee anything if
combined straightaway with classic EBIA. To reinforce this point, we have made
use of tickets composed by nonces, which are used, among other purposes, to
avoid replay and MITM attacks and provide freshness to the protocol messages
[14]. The concept of tickets has been widely used in protocols and systems like
Kerberos [31]. In our protocol, the user has to interact directly with the ticket
created by the server. In fact, once tickets are generated, the user stores it in
3http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/
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her/his computer in order to prove her/his when demanded. In our protocol,
tickets are generated by applying a one-way hash function (in our case, SHA-
2) to the concatenation of a nonce [5, Chapter 3], and the identifier of the
email account of the requesting user. Nonces are generated from a chaos based
PseudoRandomNumberGenerator (PRNG) (see [33]), and the resulting ticket
is sent through an SSL-protected channel when the user applies for registration.
Therefore, each ticket is univocally linked to a single request, since it is used as a
receipt when asking for a digital identity and subsequently discarded. This way
only who initiates the registration request will be able to complete it, solving
the problem of sniffing the activation link.
5 Security and usability analysis of the protocol
In the following sections we depict the secrecy and authenticity analysis by
using ProVerif. We start with the formalization of the protocol into applied
pi-calculus, which is used as input for ProVerif. After that, we will explain the
necessary conditions that our protocol needs to fulfill in order to convey the
required security properties. These conditions will be checked using ProVerif.
However, although secrecy and authenticity are main requirements of our proto-
col, but we must also assure usability. In Section 5.5 we consider some usability
aspects, along with the results of a usability test carried out with real users.
5.1 Formalization
Security protocols can be interpreted as concurrent systems, and thus they can
be modelled using process calculi [13]. Pi-calculus is one of those calculi, and
it has been succesfully applied to model and analyse cryptographyc primitives.
Nevertheless, the application of pi-calculus to this matter is not straightforward.
It had to be modified, and thus the spi-calculus and applied pi-calculus were
proposed. In this work we use Proverif, which is a practical implementation
of applied pi-calculus. Next, we describe how our protocol has been defined
according to the notation of Proverif. Since the focus is on the application of
the tool to our setup, the inner details of pi- and spi-calculus are not explained.
The reader is referred to [29, 1] for further details.
We summarize the main components we used in Listing 1. In addition, in the
formalization of the protocol the principals (user, ws, ra, ca) are noted using
lower case letters to avoid confussion; when not referring to the formalization,
principals are denoted with capital letters (User, WS, RA, CA). Different mes-
sages are exchanged in each of those processes, which are labelled according
to the pattern pattern msgX , with X ranging from 1 to 10, plus an extra
message msgcode which is sent during the multichannel authentication. In
the four processes (User, WS, RA and CA) net represents a public channel,
which means that the attacker can eavesdrop on it, insert messages, and so on.
The private channel securemobilephonechannel is the one used for multichan-
nel authentication and the also private channels privateSSLuserchannel and
14
privateSSLwschannel are used for SSL negotiation.
out ( c ,m) : Sends the message m through the channel c
in ( c ,m) : Rece ives the message m through the channel c
new n : Creates the new name n
P |Q : Given the p roc e s s e s P and Q , executes both in p a r a l l e l
!P : Given the process P r e p l i c a t e s i t any number o f t imes
Listing 1: Basics of the pi-calculus notation.
As mentioned above, our registration protocol is built upon four different pro-
cesses, simulating the principals of the protocol, plus two processes to simulate
SSL negotiation between the User/attacker and the WS. We show below these
processes, plus the preamble with the functions, types and queries definitions.
Additionally, the complete source code is available at [16].
Preamble (Listing 2) The preamble is where the data types, functions, events,
queries, etc. are defined in ProVerif. In our case, we use typical encryp-
tion/decryption functions, plus specialized functions for encryption/de-
cryption of digital identities. We also define private channels for SSL
negotiation and SMS sending, and several selfdescriptive data types and
free variables.
1 (∗∗ Data types ∗∗)
2 type Host .
3 type Nonce .
4 type Key .
5 type Tag .
6 type Ticket .
7 type Id .
8 type Eid . (∗ Encrypted Id ∗)
9 type Link .
10
11 (∗∗ Channels ∗∗)
12
13 (∗ A public channel . ∗)
14 free net : channel .
15
16 (∗ A secure channel used f o r mult i channel au then t i c a t i on ∗)
17 free securemobi l ephonechannel : channel [ private ] .
18
19 (∗ A private channel f o r SSL nego t i a t i on s . ∗)
20 free pr ivateSSLuserchanne l : channel [ private ] .
21
22 (∗ A private channel f o r SSL nego t i a t i on s . ∗)
23 free privateSSLwschannel : channel [ private ] .
24
25
26 (∗∗ Pr i n c i p a l s ∗∗)
27 free ws , ra , ca : Host . (∗ The s e r v e r s names . ∗)
28
29 (∗∗ Message tags . ∗∗)
30 free msg1 , msg2 , msg3 , msg4 , msg5 , msg6 , msg7 , msg8 , msg9 , msg10 : Tag .
31 free msgcode : Tag .
32
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33 (∗∗ Constructors and de s t ru c to r s ∗∗)
34
35 (∗ Encryption and decrypt i on ∗)
36 fun encrypt ( b i t s t r i n g , Key ) : b i t s t r i n g .
37 reduc f o r a l l m: b i t s t r i n g , k : Key ; decrypt ( encrypt (m, k ) , k ) = m.
38
39 (∗ ID encrypt i on and decrypt i on ∗)
40 (∗ We use d i f f e r e n t f unc t i on s f o r ID encrypt i on / decrypt i on
41 f o r the s e c r e cy que r i e s ∗)
42 fun encrypt id ( Id , Key ) : Eid .
43 reduc f o r a l l i d : Id , k : Key ; decrypt id ( encrypt id ( id , k ) , k ) = id .
44
45 (∗∗ Events ∗∗)
46 event UserReques tsReg i s t rat i on (Host ) .
47 event WSSendsSMS(Host , Nonce ) .
48 event UserProcessesSMS (Host , Nonce ) .
49 event WSSendsLink (Host , Link ) .
50 event RASendsTicket ( Host , Ticket ) .
51 event UserRece ivesReg i s t rat i onData (Host , Ticket , Link ) .
52 event UserReceivesId (Host , Id ) .
53 event CASendsId(Host , Id ) .
54
55 (∗∗ The que r i e s . ∗∗)
56
57 (∗ Secrecy ∗)
58
59 (∗ The ID must remain s e c r e t both the encrypted and
60 unencrypted ve r s i on s ∗)
61 query i d : Id , k :Key ; a t ta cke r ( encrypt id (new id , k ) ) .
62 query i d : Id ; a t t a cke r (new i d ) .
63
64 (∗ Authent i c i ty ∗)
65
66 (∗ Each time the CA generates and sends an ID to a
67 user h , i t i s because that user h has reques ted an
68 ID at l e a s t once ∗)
69 query h : Host , i d : Id ;
70 in j−event (CASendsId(h , i d ) ) ==>
71 event ( UserReques tsReg i s t rat i on (h ) ) .
72
73 (∗ Each time a user r e c e i v e s an ID , i t has been
74 sent by the CA ∗)
75 query h : Host , i d : Id ;
76 in j−event ( UserReceivesId (h , i d ) ) ==>
77 in j−event (CASendsId(h , i d ) ) .
78
79 (∗ Each time a user p ro c e s s e s an SMS, he has p r ev i ou s l y
80 reques ted i t and i t has been sent by the WS ∗)
81 query h : Host , c : Nonce ;
82 in j−event ( UserProcessesSMS (h , c ) ) ==>
83 ( in j−event (WSSendsSMS(h , c ) ) &&
84 in j−event ( UserReques tsReg i s t rat i on (h ) ) ) .
85
86 (∗ Each time a user r e c e i v e s the r e g i s t r a t i o n data ( l i n k and
87 t i c k e t ) , the l i n k has been sent by the WS and the t i c k e t
88 by the RA ∗)
89 query h : Host , t : Ticket , l : Link ;
16
90 in j−event ( UserRece ivesReg i s t rat i onData (h , t , l ) ) ==>
91 ( in j−event (WSSendsLink (h , l ) ) &&
92 in j−event ( RASendsTicket (h , t ) ) ) .
93
94 (∗ query h : Host , c : Nonce ;
95 in j−event (WSSendsSMS(h , c ) ) ==>
96 in j−event ( UserReques tsReg i s t rat i on (h ) ) . ∗)
Listing 2: ProVerif’s preamble.
Process User (Listing 3) The user first “creates” his personal data. After
proving his identity sending the code he receives by SMS, he obtains the
registration ticket and activation link, and uses them to finalize the regis-
tration, receiving his digital identity. Note that three SSL key negotiations
are performed. The first corresponds with the initial registration request,
after which the user will receive an SMS. Subsequently, the user will re-
spond with that code and receive the registration ticket and activation
link. These messages that the user sends or receives correspond to the
messages 1, 2, 3 and 8 of Fig. 5 and 10 and 18 of Fig. 6.
1 (∗∗ The user process . ∗∗)
2 l et us e rp ro c e s s =
3
4 (∗ "Create " user data ∗)
5 new u : Host ;
6
7 (∗ Launches the SSL key nego t i a t i on process f o r t h i s
8 1 s t s e s s i o n ∗)
9 out ( pr ivateSSLuserchannel , ( u , ws ) ) ;
10 in ( pr ivateSSLuserchanne l , (=u,=ws , kss luws1 : Key ) ) ;
11
12 (∗ Te l l s WS to s t a r t the r e g i s t r a t i o n process ∗)
13 event UserReques tsReg i s t rat i on (u ) ;
14 out ( net , encrypt ( (msg1 , u , ws ) , kss luws1 ) ) ;
15
16 (∗ After r eque s t i ng to s t a r t the r e g i s t r a t i o n process , u
17 r e c e i v e s a code v ia SMS ∗)
18 in ( securemobi l ephonechannel , (=u , code : Nonce ) ) ;
19 event UserProcessesSMS (u , code ) ;
20
21 (∗ Send the code v ia the net channel to conf i rm i d en t i t y ∗)
22 out ( pr ivateSSLuserchannel , ( u , ws ) ) ;
23 in ( pr ivateSSLuserchanne l , (=u,=ws , kss luws2 : Key ) ) ;
24 out ( net , encrypt ( ( msgcode , u , ws , code ) , kss luws2 ) ) ;
25
26 (∗ Rece ives the r e g i s t r a t i o n t i c k e t and the a c t i v a t i o n l i n k ∗)
27 in ( net , ( cmsg4 : b i t s t r i n g , l i n k : Link ) ) ;
28 l et (=msg4 , =ws , =u , t i c k e t : Ticket , =l i n k ) =
29 decrypt ( cmsg4 , kss luws2 ) in
30 event UserRece ivesReg i s t rat i onData (u , t i ck e t , l i n k ) ;
31
32 (∗ Launches the SSL key nego t i a t i on process f o r
33 t h i s 3 rd s e s s i o n ∗)
34 out ( pr ivateSSLuserchannel , ( u , ws ) ) ;
35 in ( pr ivateSSLuserchanne l , (=u,=ws , kss luws3 : Key ) ) ;
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36
37 (∗ Acces s es the a c t i v a t i o n l i n k and prov ides the r e g i s t r a t i o n
38 t i c k e t ∗)
39 new k :Key ;
40 out ( net , ( encrypt ( (msg5 , u , ws , t i ck e t , l i nk , k ) , kss luws3 ) , l i n k ) ) ;
41
42 (∗ Rece ives the d i g i t a l i d e n t i t y ∗)
43 in ( net , cmsg10 : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
44 l et (=msg10,=ws,=u , e id : Eid ) = decrypt ( cmsg10 , kss luws3 ) in
45 l et i d = decrypt id ( eid , k ) in
46 event UserReceivesId (u , i d ) ;
47 0 .
Listing 3: Process User.
Process WS (Listing 4) TheWS receives the initial registration request from
a user (or the attacker). Sends an SMS via the securemobilephonechannel
and after receiving back the code, it requests a registration ticket to the
RA and generates an activation link. When the link is accessed, it makes a
request for a digital identity and finally forwards it to the user. The same
SSL negotiations are perfomed here than in the user process. Note also
that, since the WS and the RA are trusted third parties not in control of
the attacker, we deliver them a symmetric key for securely communicating
between them from the beginning. The messages sent or received by the
WS correspond with the messages in steps 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8 of Fig. 5
and 10, 12, 17 and 18 of Fig. 6.
1 (∗∗ The ws process . ∗∗)
2 l et wsprocess ( kwsra : Key) =
3
4 (∗ Waits un t i l someone s t a r t s the 1 s t SSL key nego t i a t i on ∗)
5 in ( privateSSLwschannel , (u : Host ,=ws , kss luws1 : Key ) ) ;
6
7 (∗ Rece ives the reques t to s t a r t the r e g i s t r a t i o n process ∗)
8 in ( net , cmsg1 : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
9 l et (=msg1,=u,=ws) = decrypt ( cmsg1 , kss luws1 ) in
10
11 (∗ After e s t a b l i s h i n g the SSL s e s s i o n with u , the ws , knows who
12 u is , and sends him a code v ia the extra secure channel
13 − that is , by SMS ∗)
14 new code : Nonce ;
15 event WSSendsSMS(u , code ) ;
16 out ( securemobi l ephonechannel , (u , code ) ) ;
17
18 (∗ Rece ives the keys o f the 2nd SSL key nego t i a t i on ∗)
19 in ( pr ivateSSLuserchanne l , (=u,=ws , kss luws2 : Key ) ) ;
20 in ( net , cmsgcode : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
21 l et (=msgcode , =u , =ws , =code ) = decrypt ( cmsgcode , kss luws2 ) in
22
23 (∗ Request a r e g i s t r a t i o n t i c k e t to the RA, c r e a t e s an
24 a c t i v a t i o n l i n k and forward them to the user ∗)
25 out ( net , encrypt ( (msg2 , ws , ra , u ) , kwsra ) ) ;
26 in ( net , cmsg3 : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
27 l et (=msg3,=ra ,=ws,=u , t i c k e t : Ticket ) = decrypt ( cmsg3 , kwsra ) in
18
28 new l i n k : Link ;
29 event WSSendsLink (u , l i n k ) ;
30 out ( net , ( encrypt ( (msg4 , ws , u , t i ck e t , l i n k ) , kss luws2 ) , l i n k ) ) ;
31
32 (∗ Waits un t i l the 3 rd SSL key nego t i a t i on ∗)
33 in ( privateSSLwschannel , (=u,=ws , kss luws3 :Key ) ) ;
34
35 (∗ Proces s es the ac c e s s to the a c t i v a t i o n l i n k and forwards
36 the r e c e i v ed r e g i s t r a t i o n t i c k e t to the RA ∗)
37 in ( net , ( cmsg5 : b i t s t r i n g ,= l i n k ) ) ;
38 l et (=msg5,=u,=ws , t i ck e t ’ : Ticket ,= l ink , k :Key) =
39 decrypt ( cmsg5 , kss luws3 ) in
40 out ( net , encrypt ( (msg6 , ws , ra , u , t i ck e t ’ , k ) , kwsra ) ) ;
41
42 (∗ Rece ives the d i g i t a l i d e n t i t y and forwards i t to the user ∗)
43 in ( net , cmsg9 : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
44 l et (=msg9,=ra ,=ws,=u , e id : Eid ) = decrypt ( cmsg9 , kwsra ) in
45 out ( net , encrypt ( ( msg10 , ws , u , e id ) , kss luws3 ) ) .
Listing 4: Process WS.
Process RA (Listing 5) The RA receives a request from a user via the WS.
After validating the user data, the RA creates a ticket for that user and
sends it to the WS. When the ticket is received again, compares it to the
one previously created. If they match, the RA makes a request to the CA
for the generation of a digital identity for that user. In the end, the RA
forwards the digital identity to the WS. The RA shares secret keys with
the WS and the CA, pre-established from the beginning. The messages
involving the RA correspond with messages 4 and 6 of Fig. 5 and 12, 14,
16 and 17 of Fig. 6.
1 (∗∗ The ra process . ∗∗)
2 l et r ap ro c e s s ( kwsra : Key , kraca :Key) =
3
4 (∗ Rece ives the reques t f o r a new r e g i s t r a t i o n t i c k e t ∗)
5 in ( net , cmsg2 : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
6 l et (=msg2,=ws,=ra , u : Host ) = decrypt ( cmsg2 , kwsra ) in
7
8 (∗ Create the t i c k e t and send i t to the WS ∗)
9 new t i c k e t : Ticket ;
10 event RASendsTicket (u , t i c k e t ) ;
11 out ( net , encrypt ( (msg3 , ra , ws , u , t i c k e t ) , kwsra ) ) ;
12
13 (∗ Receive a supposedly l e g i t ima t e r e g i s t r a t i o n t i c k e t ∗)
14 in ( net , cmsg6 : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
15 l et (=msg6,=ws,=ra ,=u , t i ck e t ’ : Ticket , k : Key) =
16 decrypt ( cmsg6 , kwsra ) in
17
18 (∗ Checks the t i c k e t . I f everyth ing i s OK, reques t the CA
19 a new d i g i t a l i d e n t i t y f o r the correspond ing user ∗)
20 i f t i ck e t ’ = t i c k e t then
21 out ( net , encrypt ( (msg7 , ra , ca , u , k ) , kraca ) ) ;
22
23 (∗ Receive and forward the d i g i t a l i d e n t i t y ∗)
24 in ( net , cmsg8 : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
19
25 l et (=msg8,=ca ,=ra ,=u , e id : Eid ) = decrypt ( cmsg8 , kraca ) in
26 out ( net , encrypt ( (msg9 , ra , ws , u , e id ) , kwsra ) ) .
Listing 5: Process RA.
Process CA (Listing 6) The CA only receives requests from the RA. For
each request, the CA generates a digital identity with the user data re-
ceived and sends the digital identity to the RA. The CA therefore shares
a secret key with the RA, also pre-established from the beginning. These
messages correspond with the messages 16 and 17 of Fig. 6.
1 (∗∗ The ca process . ∗∗)
2 l et caproces s ( kraca : Key) =
3
4 (∗ Rece ives a reques t o f a new d i g i t a l i d e n t i t y ∗)
5 in ( net , cmsg7 : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
6 l et (=msg7,=ra ,=ca , u : Host , k : Key) = decrypt ( cmsg7 , kraca ) in
7
8 (∗ Create the d i g i t a l i d e n t i t y and send i t to the RA ∗)
9 new i d : Id ;
10 l et e id = encrypt id ( id , k ) in
11 event CASendsId(u , i d ) ;
12 out ( net , encrypt ( (msg8 , ca , ra , u , e id ) , kraca ) ) .
Listing 6: Process CA.
SSL negotiation processes (Listing 7) The user communicates with theWS
through SSL channels. The corresponding keys are established using the
process sslkeynegotiationprocess. We simulate the capability of the at-
tacker to establish SSL sessions with the WS using the process sslbypass,
which creates a key, makes it public, and sends it to the WS like a key
created with a legitimate user.
1 (∗∗ SSL nego t i a t i on process ∗∗)
2 (∗ − used j u s t between the User and WS ∗)
3 l et s s l k e yn e g o t i a t i o np r o c e s s =
4
5 (∗ u i s the user who i s supposedly e s t a b l i s h i n g a SSL
6 s e s s i o n with WS a i s who r e a l l y i s e s t a b l i s h i n g the
7 SSL s e s s i o n WS ∗)
8 in ( pr ivateSSLuserchanne l , (u : Host ,=ws ) ) ;
9
10 (∗ Creates the new SSL s e s s i o n key ∗)
11 new kss luws :Key ;
12
13 (∗ Send the new SSL key through the p r i v a t e s s l c h ann e l
14 channel , to l et WS know the new key − and the user , in
15 case i t i s not the a t ta cke r who e s t a b l i s h e s the s e s s i o n ∗)
16 out ( pr ivateSSLuserchanne l , (u , ws , kss luws ) ) ;
17 out ( privateSSLwschannel , (u , ws , kss luws ) ) .
18
19 (∗∗ This process a l l ows the a t ta cke r to establish SSL s e s s i o n s
20 with the ws ∗∗)
21 l et s s l bypa s s =
20
22
23 in ( net , (h : Host ,=ws ) ) ;
24 new kss lhws :Key ;
25 out ( net , kss lhws ) ;
26 out ( privateSSLwschannel , (h , ws , kss lhws ) ) .
Listing 7: Processes for SSL negotiation.
Main process (Listing 8) The previous principals are called from the main
process. In this process the secret shared keys between the trusted third
parties are created. Obviously, we allow several replications for each prin-
cipal.
1 (∗∗ The system . ∗∗)
2 process
3
4 (∗ Since the WS, RA and CA are t ru s t ed th i rd pa r t i e s , we can
5 establish symmetric keys f o r communications between them ∗)
6
7 new kwsra : Key ;
8 new kraca : Key ;
9
10 (∗ Launch a l l the p ro c e s s e s ∗)
11 ( ( ! u s e rp ro c e s s ) (∗ Users ∗)
12 | ( ! s s l k e yn e g o t i a t i o np r o c e s s ) (∗ SSL nego t i a t i on ∗)
13 | ( ! s s l bypa s s ) (∗ Attacker SSL bypass ∗)
14 | ( ! wsprocess ( kwsra ) ) (∗ Moodle Server ∗)
15 | ( ! r ap ro c e s s ( kwsra , kraca ) ) (∗ RA ∗)
16 | ( ! caproces s ( kraca ) ) (∗ CA ∗)
17 )
Listing 8: Main process.
These four processes make up the fourth step in our methodology and, conse-
quently, we can proceed with the security analysis of the registration protocol.
In the next section we prove the security properties required in Section 4.1.
5.2 A quick introduction to ProVerif
ProVerif4 is an automatic formal verifier of security properties for communica-
tion protocols [10]. It accepts a formal definition of a protocol as pi-calculus
instructions or Horn clauses [25], and a set of secrecy and/or events’ correspon-
dence queries to be proved. In both cases (pi-calculus and Horn clauses), the
input is transformed into a set of Horn clauses which is completed and refined in
a series of iterations. After the completion, a goal-directed depth-first search is
carried out to prove the specified queries. Roughly speaking, secrecy verification
is performed by applying ProVerif to assess if any of the implied terms can be
derived from the obtained ruleset. To prove authenticity, we use Proverif to test
the possibility of creating an execution trace of the protocol in which any of the
4http://www.proverif.ens.fr/
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events correspondences is broken. That is: if event A is supposed to happen
before event B (because it is said so in a correspondence query) and ProVerif
finds a trace in which that does not happen, then the correspondence is broken.
Note that, by definition, an attacker is a process in which no event occurs [11].
To ask ProVerif to prove if a protocol keeps a given property, it has to be
explicitly inquired about it using proper instructions. The output of Proverif
indicates if the queried security properties do or do not hold. If ProVerif founds
that the property related to a specific query is false, it will show, along with an
attack trace, something like5:
The attacker has the message property.
A trace has been found.
RESULT not attacker:property is false.
5.3 Secrecy
In ProVerif, secrecy properties can be checked with queries of the form:
query attacker(T).
Which is the way to ask ProVerif to test if the attacker can gain knowledge
of some term T.
Since the aim of our protocol is to convey private digital identities to new
users, these identities must remain secret. Moreover, in our protocol, the dig-
ital identities are sent encrypted under a symmetric key specified by the user.
Therefore, even if this encrypted versions of the digital identities fall into the
hands of an attacker, the secrecy is considered broken. More formally:
Definition 1. CHAT-SRP preserves secrecy if neither the created digital iden-
tities nor their corresponding encrypted versions are disclosed to attackers.
We check this in ProVerif with the queries in lines 61 and 62 of Listing 2. As
a result, ProVerif informs that the corresponding secrecy properties are held.
Therefore, given ProVerif’s soundness property, we have the guarantee that no
attacker gains knowledge of the digital identities nor their encyrpted versions.
5.4 Authenticity
The way of proving authenticity properties with ProVerif is by means of cor-
respondence assertions [38, 12]. These correspondence assertions allow us to
check, for instance, if a given event e always preceeds another event e′. Since
the attackers are, by definition, processes without events, if an event occurs,
it must have been invoked by a legitimate process. Moreover, we can include
5We exclude some extra identifiers appended by ProVerif to the names, which are used to
differentiate between different runs of the processes. Take into account that a single process
can be executed several times, and ProVerif has to distinguish the different variables created
in each run.
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variables in these events, to see if a given variable has the same value in an event
e than in another event e′.
Since, after a successful execution of our protocol, a new user acquires a digital
identity which will be linked to him in the interactive platform, this identity
must fulfill authenticity requirements (besides being kept secret). Specifically,
we require that if the CA sends a digital identity to an user, then the legitimate
corresponding user has requested it. This guarantees that no user receives a
digital identity of a different user, and that only legitimate users can request
a digital identity. We also need to guarantee that, every time a user receives
a digital identity, it has been created by the CA. These requirements are more
formally stated in definitions 2 and 3, respectively, corresponding to the lines
69 and 75 in Listing 2:
Definition 2. If the CA issues a digital identity intended for a user h, then the
legitimate user h must have requested it, at least once.
Definition 3. If a user receives a digital identity id, that digital identity id
must have been issued by the Certification Authority.
While the second requirement is held even if we do not make use of multichan-
nel authentication, the first requirement does need this additional mechanism.
To see this, one can delete lines 16 to 24 in Listing 3 and lines 11 to 21 in List-
ing 4 in order to eliminate the multichannel authentication in the formalization.
After doing so, ProVerif founds a trace that contradicts the property required
in definition 2. In short, after establishing an SSL session with the WS, the at-
tacker provides all the required data in order to successfully impersonate some
user. As a result, the attacker finally obtains an illegitimate, but valid, digital
identity. This was the attack described in the first paragraph of section 4.3.
Therefore, this helps us see why we need to share some information with
verified authenticity. The fact of using multichannel authentication enforces the
robustness of our protocol. In any case, this multichannel exchange also needs
to be verified. Namely, we will require that each time a user processes a code
received via SMS, that same user has previously requested registration and the
WS has send to him the same code. A logical consequence of this, captured
in another requirement is that, each time a user receives a registration ticket
and an activation link, then the RA has generated that same registration ticket
and the WS has created the same activation link. These two requirements are
formally stated in definitions 4 and 5, respectively, and are coded in lines 81
and 89 in Listing 2:
Definition 4. Each time a user h processes an SMS with a code c, then the
WS has send to that user h an SMS containing the code c, and the user h has
also requested to be registered in the system.
Definition 5. Each time a user h receives a registration ticket t and an activa-
tion link l, then previously the RA has created the ticket t, the WS has created
the link l, and both have sent them to the same user h.
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After running ProVerif with the previous correspondence assertions, it informs
that the associated properties are kept. Again, ProVerif soundness guarantees
the result.
Nonetheless, one more point is worth to be noted. In the multichannel alter-
native, the attacker is yet capable to start a registration process by providing
the required data to the WS. But, in this case the WS will check if it knows
the mobile phone number of the user who is allegedly requesting registration.
If possitive, the WS will send an SMS to the known number. When the real
user receives the SMS, he will know that someone is trying to impersonate him,
and he will ignore the SMS, and even inform the corresponding authority. Even
though it was the attacker who started the registration, and not the real user,
the WS will be sending an SMS to the correct number, and the registration will
not succeed. This fact can be seen if we uncomment the query in line 95 of
Listing 2, which informs us that a given user will not always process an SMS
with a given code, even though the WS has previously sent it. This is not a
weakness of the protocol. In fact, it is rather telling us that the multichannel
authentication is working, because it serves to avoid impersonation.
5.5 Usability
As we have already said, usability and security inevitably lead to a tradeoff
where the system designers. must find an adequate equilibrium. In [23], the au-
thors pinpoint some real situations where a system or protocol was not widely
used, although a high level of security was implemented. All the reasons there
stated concern usability: interface complexity, difficult configuration, etc. More-
over, they give examples of secure (but not usable) systems replaced by usable
(but less secure) ones, even though the original purpose of both systems slightly
differed.
It is even astonishing that, among the most known cryptographic principles,
those written by Kerchkoffs in 1883 there is one principle referring this matter
(see [27, page 12]). It is the last of 6 principles, and states:
Principle (Kerckhoffs). Lastly, it is needed, given the circumstances that com-
mand its application, for the system to be easily usable, not requiring mental
strain nor the knowledge of a long series of rules.
The problem here is that there is no exact or even approximate equation,
theory or whatever that could tell if a system is 100% usable. Therefore, the
approach we have taken here is to base our work in concepts that are familiar
to the vast majority of the potential users of our protocol (that will ease its
understanding). Regarding the base and familiar concepts of our system, we
can resume the protocol in three of them:
1. EBIA: Email Based Identification and Authentication ([22]). It is the
starting point we took for our protocol. It links each user identity to his
or her email account. As emails are something to which everyone is used
nowadays, it keeps the property of familiarity.
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2. Tickets: They are used to strengthen the basic EBIA system. Created
from a chaotically-generated random number concatenated with some user
dependent data. They serve to univocally link each specific user with a
single registration request. They are used as a nonces, so once used, they
are deleted in order to avoid multiple registrations. As we said in [17],
everyone is used to get tickets in real life and keep them as a recepit to
prove something later (e.g., to return clothes). Therefore, it also keeps the
property of familiarity.
3. SMS: When used the multichannel authentication combining emails and
SMS, the user will receive a short PIN into his mobile phone. Although
this might not be a very common practice yet, it is gaining popularity, and
mobile phones take a central roles in technology users nowadays. It seems
then that, when used, this option still keeps the property of familiarity.
Keeping the familiarity, what remains is to create a friendly, self-descriptive,
intuitive and as simple as possible interface, and that will not depend on the
protocol itself. Nevertheless, the best, and maybe the only, way to foresee the
users acceptance, is to test the system with real and potential users. Therefore,
as a proof of concept, we performed some trials with real and potential users
(students at our university). In these trials, the users were given a global de-
scription of the system. After the introduction, they had to register themselves
in the Moodle test platform6. The registration process tested did not include the
two-factor authentication scheme including SMS, but just the activation email
and the ticket. At last, they were requested to fill up a questionnaire with the
questions related to the adjectives in Table 1. From those tests we gained very
valuable feedback and quite positive opinions, which are summarized in Table
1.
Adjective Mean score (1 to 5)
Simple 3.60
Quick 4.20
Intuitive 3.19
Well developed 4.26
Secure 4.86
Useful 4.65
Trustworthy 4.73
Advisable for use 4.73
Table 1: Results of the trials performed with real users to measure the usability
of the protocol. For each question, concerning an adjective describing the sys-
tem, the user had to answer with a numerical score, ranging from 1 to 5, where
1 meant “Completely disagree” and 5 meant “Completely agree”. A total of 15
persons took the test.
6They also had to digitally sign an online exam, but we do not treat that matter here.
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In the results, the first four adjectives can be considered as directly related to
usability. The last four, although not directly related, will get bad scores may
the user not understand or not know how to use the system, so they can also
be seen as indirect measures of usability. Moreover, the users still have a sense
of being using a secure system, which increases their confidence on the system,
considering it trustworthy and advisable for use, may they find themselves in
a situation in which they had to decide whether to incorporate the protocol
or not. This latter property is quite important, because it highlights that the
users admit a slight loss in usability (that is inevitable) in order to gain in
security. Nevertheless, we have obtained very valuable feedback during the
tests, regarding usability, and hope to be able to improve it.
6 Conclusion
In this work we have presented a new registration protocol for interactive and
collaborative platforms, CHAT-SRP (CHAos basedTickets-SecureRegistration
Protocol), which provides a very reasonable tradeoff between security and us-
ability.
We have taken as starting point the EBIA model, which provides us a good
reference from the usability perspective, since it is the most widely used proto-
col for registration in interactive platforms. As for its security, we have circum-
vented the two main problems inherent to these protocols. Namely, we prevent
impersonation (with an authenticated extra channel) and MITM attacks (with
the incorporation of registration tickets). Nevertheless, we still required to for-
mally verify that our measures successfully avoid those weaknesses. Therefore,
to evaluate the security of the protocol we have followed a methodology divided
in interconnected phases. Obviously, the first one was to determine the pro-
tocol goals, which for us is to provide the new users with a digital identity.
Once known that, we have established a general security model (the Dolev-Yao
model, which assumes that the protocol uses perfect and unbreakable crypto-
graphic primitives), in order to be available later to check if the required pro-
perties are held. After setting the general security model, we have defined the
security requirements. In our case, we required secrecy and authenticity for the
distributed digital identity. The next logical step is to formalize the protocol
in a language suitable for being analyzed with formal tools, task undertaken in
Section 4. We have used the applied pi-calculus for that purpose. At last, it
remains to formally verify that the required properties are held. We have made
use of ProVerif to verify them. In Section 5 we proved these properties along
with a usability analysis of the protocol.
As we have proved using ProVerif (Section 5.3), our protocol keeps the secrecy
of the digital identities, and it also keeps the authenticity property (Section 5.4)
when facing both internal and external attackers. Of course, both according to
the security model we have assumed. It does so by the combination of a mul-
tichannel authentication method (with some previous knowledge in the form
of a mobile phone number) and of a registration ticket we have introduced to
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univocally link each user with his corresponding request during the whole pro-
cess. This ticket is created by introducing chaos based pseudo-random nonces,
concatenated with the user email, which is used as preliminary identifier.
We have made use of concepts familiar to the users: EBIA, tickets, and
SMS. Nevertheless, for measuring the usability there is no more precise science
than usability tests involving real users. For that purpose, we have carried out
some trials with potential users. For the tests, we incorporated our protocol
(without the two-factor SMS authentication) into a Moodle platform, which is
the perfect scenario for testing our protocol. As a result of the distribution of
digital identities, the users who took part in the test were able to deliver digitally
signed online exams, and became the first users to do so in our university. After
the tests, they filled up a questionnaire asking about their experience with the
system. The obtained results have been shown in Section 5.5. From them we can
conclude that the acceptance is high, although we can still improve it. Besides,
we received very valuable feedback.
As a result of providing digital identities to users of such collaborative and
interactive systems, a full range of new cryptographically robust funcionality is
available for them. This provides greater security than using just SSL protected
communications, since the users can now authenticate themselves with their dig-
ital identities. They could do it with SSL, may they have a digital identity, but
they would not have one until our protocol (or other similar) provides them with
one. Also, the fact of distributing digital identities in a standard format (like
X.509), opens very interesting posibilities, like seamlessly adding advanced func-
tionalities like privacy-friendly authentication and anonymity [28, 9]. Moreover,
as we have seen from the tests, the users do perceive a greater security when
they have their personal digital identity available (justified, as we have seen).
This makes them have a greater trust in the system, increasing their acceptance,
as they usually have to provide sensitive data to this kind of systems.
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